Abstract : This study explores an evolutionary analysis on a negotiation model based on Masbiole (Multiagent Systems with Symbiotic Learning and Evolution) which has been proposed as a new methodology of Multiagent Systems (MAS) based on symbiosis in the ecosystem. In Masbiole, agents evolve in consideration of not only their own benefits and losses, but also the benefits and losses of opponent agents. To aid effective application of Masbiole, we develop a competitive negotiation model where rigorous and advanced intelligent decision-making mechanisms are required for agents to achieve solutions. A Negotiation Protocol is devised aiming at developing a set of rules for agents' behavior during evolution. Simulations use a newly developed evolutionary computing technique, called Genetic Network Programming (GNP) which has the directed graph-type gene structure that can develop and design the required intelligent mechanisms for agents. In a typical scenario, competitive negotiation solutions are reached by concessions that are usually predetermined in the conventional MAS. In this model, however, not only concession is determined automatically by symbiotic evolution (making the system intelligent, automated, and efficient) but the solution also achieves Pareto optimal automatically.
Introduction
Multiagent Systems with Symbiotic Learning and Evolution (Masbiole) [1] , [2] is an extension of conventional Multiagent Systems (MAS). Masbiole introduced "Symbiosis", a biological relationship in the ecosystem in which two species live in close proximity to each other and interact regularly in such a way as to benefit both species, sometimes one species benefits at the other's expense, and in other cases neither species benefits. Agents in Masbiole can learn or evolve to optimize their objectives considering the benefits/losses of both themselves and opponent agents. Therefore, agents can change their strategies more flexibly.
Multiagent Systems (MAS) [3] , [4] are systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents. MAS can be used to solve problems that are difficult for an individual agent to solve. Agents in MAS consider their own objectives i.e., self interests only; as a result, the strategy of agents is limited or onesided. Therefore, solutions in MAS produce "Nash Equilibria" [5] under the assumption that when one agent is using the self-interested strategy the other can do no better than using the same itself. Overcoming the Nash Equilibria is one of the major issues to improve the performance of MAS. For this reason, in matters of common interest, reaching a solution in a dynamic problem space is sometimes difficult. Solutions utilizing Masbiole, on the other hand, can achieve Pareto optimality because the agents consider the objectives of the opponent agents and not just their own. Therefore, the solutions based on Masbiole can solve the above issues of Nash Equilibria. Considering the above background of MAS and biological phenomena in na-ture, this study demonstrates that Masbiole can be applied in many fields to solve complex real-world problems.
Up to now, the studies of Masbiole have been applied only to MAS test beds such as the Iterative Prisoner's Dilemma Game [6] , the Tile-world [7] , and the Match Type Tileworld [8] , where Masbiole's basic characteristics and effectiveness have been examined. However, the competitive and dynamic problems in these studies have not been formulated to require intelligent decision-making from agents. Moreover, Masbiole cannot be used merely in some test beds of MAS. Therefore, in order to better understand the various effective applications of Masbiole, we designed a new test model (the "Competitive Negotiation Model") that would require intelligent decision-making from agents, allowing to examine the characteristics and behaviors of agents in an environment where success is more difficult. In addition, the proposed model can be applied in a real world complex negotiation problem. For example, in a common price negotiation, the negotiators always try to maximize their own profit i.e., maximizing their own objectives. On the other hand, as business environment has become more complicated day by day, it is necessary to consider the objectives of both itself and the opponent organization, not just its own. The proposed model that uses the concept of symbiosis in Masbiole and the evolutionary computing technique can enhance the ability of a business organization for taking intelligent decision making ability in an environment where different strategies are required. In addition, the characteristics and behaviors of agents in Masbiole can be examined more effectively from the simulation results of the proposed model. We show how this model represents the market structure in a real situation by Masbiole. To simulate the system we utilize an evolutionary computing technique called Genetic Network Programming (GNP) that was proposed by Hirawasa et al. [9] - [14] as an extension of Genetic Algorithms (GA) [15] and Genetic Programming (GP) [16] . The main difference between them is the representation of the solutions. GA evolves strings as solutions and it is mainly applied to optimization problems. GP was devised later aiming to expand the expression ability of GA using tree structures. Instead of strings and trees, GNP has directed graph structures that can generate efficient action sequences based on both the current and past information using the "Implicit Memory Function" inherently equipped in GNP. Therefore, GNP is expected to show better performance in some complex problems more effectively and efficiently. It has been shown that GNP obtains such better results in some experiments [9] - [11] . In addition, the ability of using processing nodes and judgment nodes of GNP which works as an if-then type logical decision making function and a kind of action/processing function, respectively, seems an ideal candidate to simulate the proposed negotiation model. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the basic concept of symbiosis and related works. Section 3 explains the simulation model and algorithm. Section 4 explains the architecture and evolutionary algorithm of GNP in detail. Section 5 explains the evolution of the system. Section 6 evaluates the system with a discussion of the results. Finally, Section 7, concludes the paper with the discussion of probable future research and extension.
Basic Concept and Study of Symbiosis
Symbiosis comes from the Greek "sym" which means "with" and "bios" which means "life", and hence, the word means the "state of living with". It is the interdependence of life [17] . An example of symbiotic relation is humans and bacteria. A certain kind of bacteria lives in the intestines of humans. The bacteria partially digest food that the human cannot, allowing the human to finish the job. The bacteria benefit by getting food, and the human benefits by being able to digest the food it eats. In the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) such as Multi-Objective Genetic Algorithms (MOGAs) [18] , several examples of computational models with symbiosis have been presented. Some of the examples are briefly reviewed below. The first experiments in this area are reported by Paredis [19] . Paredis introduced the Coevolutionary Genetic Algorithm (CGA). He used symbiosis to determine the best genetic representation for an individual in a problem. In his CGA, competitive fitness is the first item discussed in which fitness calculations are dependent on the current population to some degree [20] . Competitive fitness is applied extensively in evolutionary games, including Tic-TacToe [20] , Othello [21] , the Game of Tag [22] , and the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma [23] . Merry et al. [24] define coevolution by symbiosis as follows: "When the change in fitness of one system changes the fitness of another system, and vice versa, the interdependency is called coevolution. Coevolution is the evolutionary mutual changes of species (or organisms) that interact with each other". According to Agiza et al. [25] , coevolution which considers symbiosis is associated with negative and positive interactions. Negative interactions mean predation and competition, while positive interactions include mutualism and sharing. Therefore there are two main classes of coevolutionary algorithms that have employed symbiosis: algorithms based on competition relationships, and algorithms based on cooperation relationships. Masbiole finds that there are six kinds of In the study of Masbiole in Match Type Tile-world (MTT), symbiotic relations are implemented sequentially i.e., when one agent evolves the opponent agent is fixed. The author believes that this type of sequential evolution of agents cannot solve dynamic problems like negotiation where offers and counteroffers, i.e., simultaneous evolution, are necessary to reach solutions. Moreover, according to the concept of symbiosis, when the strategy of one species is implemented the other species may not fix or stop. In MTT, Mutualism produces the best evolution for both the agent and its opponent agent, where this calculation of evolution is actually the combination of the separate evolution of two agents i.e., calculation of two separate episodes. We assume that both agents cannot get the best evolution when total resources are fixed. In this system Mutualism means sharing i.e., sharing the resource mutually where total resources (i.e., surplus) are fixed. Therefore it can produce better (but not the best) fitness for both agents. In this system only Predation can produce the best evolution/fitness for an agent, where it takes all available resources (surplus), while opponent agents receive nothing.
Masbiole can be divided into two methods, "Learning" means an individual changes its own strategy like Reinforcement Learning, and "Evolution" means several individuals (population) change their strategies by an evolutionary process like GNP. In this paper evolutionary Masbiole is studied because a relatively complex model is applied.
Symbiotic Relations
In Masbiole, symbiotic relations between two agents' i and j can be defined as the combination of improvement/deterioration in which six kinds of symbiotic relations are found in consideration of all possible types of interactions, as shown in Table 1 . These relationships can be set arbitrarily between agents. In Masbiole, Self Improvement and Self Deterioration are the particular cases and not applicable in the dynamic problem environment because of the consideration of self (onesided) evolution only. Especially, Self Improvement and Self Deterioration correspond to conventional MAS, a special case of Masbiole.
Simulation Model
In this section we define a competitive negotiation model between agent i and agent j for the simulations. Agent i and agent j correspond to two organizations negotiating over a product. For example, consider a product made by agent j. It costs him 50 yen. An agent i wants to buy the product and values it at 100 yen as agent j offers to sell it for 100 yen. Thus, this offer generates a surplus of 50 yen (100 -50 = 50). Now, agent i and agent j need to negotiate a price to divide the surplus. Agent i knows that the cost is less than 100 yen, and agent j knows that the value of his product is greater than 50 yen. Now both of them need to agree on a transaction price. In this case, both agent i and agent j try to maximize their surplus (maximizing fitness) by aiming to pay a minimal concession. At this point, they can start to negotiate on the price. Successful negotiation would generate a surplus for one or both of the agents, while no surplus will be created when the negotiation is not successful. In this scenario, both agents i and j can resort to various strategies in order to achieve their objectives of getting as much surplus as possible. An agent can obtain higher surplus while staying away from paying any concession to the opponent agent, which will result in the opponent agent obtaining lower surplus (fitness). For instance, agent i uses Predation toward agent j and expects not to pay any concession (improvement of self), while agent j pays the full concession (deterioration of opponent) in order to reach an agreement. Therefore in the simulation, the Predation of agent i is realized taking its offers to its highest price constant in response to the offers from the opponent agents. Similarly, Mutualism can be realized while agents wish to pay concession i.e., both agents accept an increased or decreased price to reach an agreement. Whereas the Competition can be realized when agents do not wish to pay any concession, that is, they both are stuck with their highest offers in response to the offers from the opponent agents in the simulation. In addition, it is relevant to mention that the way of implementation of symbiotic relations may be a little different depending on the problem nature and the method of agents' interaction. For example, the implementation of symbiotic relation in Match Type Tile-world [8] and the proposed system is a little different due to the problem nature (explained in Section 2).
Terminologies and Fitness Function
When agents meet negotiation, the fitness is calculated in consideration of the surplus they achieved. In the terminology, fi means the fitness of agent i and fj means the fitness of agent j where the aims of agent i and agent j are to maximize their fitness (i.e., surplus) from the negotiation agreement. We define the terminologies and fitness function as follows: Pi(t): The buying price proposed agent i at round t.
Pj(t):
The selling price proposed agent j at round t. Pi(0): The initial buy price of agent i. Pj(0): The initial sell price of agent j. Accordingly, the fitness values of agent i and agent j will be as follows: When agent i increases the price and satisfies Pi(t) ≥ Pj(t), the fitness of agent i and agent j are as follows, respectively.
Where, t shows the final round in one negotiation.
When agent j decrease the price and satisfies Pi(t) ≥ Pj(t), the fitness values of agent i and agent j are as follows, respectively.
When agent i increases the price and satisfies Pi(t) ≥ Pj(t), and when agent j decreases the price and satisfies Pi(t) ≥ Pj(t), the fitness functions of agent i and agent j are as follows, respec-
However, in the worst case, if an agreement condition Pi(t) ≥ Pj(t) is not satisfied until the final round of the negotiation, the fitness values of fi and fj become 0, because surplus is not generated, therefore, no benefit for either agent in this situation.
Negotiation Protocol
This section explains the rules and conditions that govern the agents' behavior during negotiation. This negotiation is held via offers and counter-offers. Offers from agent i and agent j may continue for several rounds in order to fulfill the agreement rule. One round of negotiation is considered complete when agent i and agent j propose their prices once. In the first round the negotiation begins from the initial offers proposed by agent i and agent j, and proposed prices are obtained from all of the participating agents. In this situation, when one agent proposes his/her price, the other agents maintain their most recent proposal. At each round, an action (increase price, decrease price or stay at the current price) is determined by the node transition of GNP created by evolution. The next round of negotiation begins from the proposed price offered by the agents in the previous round. In this way negotiation rounds continue, and the individual offers from the agents are obtained. When an offer from any one of the buyers and from any one of the sellers meets the agreement rule, an agreement is formed and negotiation ends with a successful deal. If the offers do not meet the agreement rule, negotiation proceeds to the next round. We experimentally sets a maximum of 100 rounds of negotiation for all participating agents. If the agents can not reach an agreement by the final round of negotiation, the negotiation ends with an unsuccessful deal. In the same way, the individuals are evolved one by way in the coevolution.
Construction of Agent
To simulate the proposed negotiation model, agents are constructed by GNP population where each individual corresponds to a GNP program. Therefore, in the following subsections, the basic architecture and features of GNP are explained. Figure 1 shows the basic structure of GNP. GNP programs are composed of one start node, plural judgment nodes and processing nodes. In Fig. 1 , there are one start node, two judgment nodes and two processing nodes, and they are connected to each other. The start node has no functions and no conditional branch. The only role of the start node is to determine the first node to be executed. Judgment nodes have conditional branch decision functions. Each judgment node returns a judgment result and determines the next node to be executed. Processing nodes work as action/processing functions. For example, processing nodes determine agents' actions such as increase price, decrease price and so on. GNP has an ability to use certain judgment/processing nodes repeatedly to achieve a task. Therefore, even if the number of nodes is predefined and small, GNP can perform well by making effective node connections based on re-using nodes. As a result, we do not have to prepare an excessive number of nodes. The compact structure of GNP is a quite important distinguished characteristic, because it contributes to saving memory consumption and calculation time.
Basic Structure of GNP

Gene Structure
The graph structure of GNP is determined by the combination of the following node genes. A genetic code of node i (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) is also shown in Fig. 1. K 
Genetic Operators in GNP
Like other evolutionary computing, in GNP, genetic operators such as crossover and mutation are used. The most commonly used selection operations are "Roulette Selection", "Tournament Selection", "Ranking Selection" and "Elite Preservation". In the crossover and mutation, we use Tournament Selection where the tournament size is 5. In addition, the best individual is preserved as an elite individual.
Crossover of GNP is executed between two parent individuals to generate two offspring. The flow of a crossover is as follows: (1) Two parent individuals are selected using a selection method. (2) Some nodes are selected as crossover nodes with the probability Pc. (3) Two parents exchange the selected corresponding nodes having the same node number and two offspring are generated.
Mutation of GNP is executed on an individual basis and new offspring is generated according to the following. (1) An individual is selected using a selection method. (2) Some branches are selected randomly for mutation with the probability Pm. (3) The selected branches are changed randomly and a new offspring is generated.
Node Functions
The author uses three kinds of processing nodes and two kinds of judgment nodes in a group. The processing nodes represent increase price (P+), decrease price (P−), or stay at the current price (Not Change). In addition, there are five kinds of P+ nodes to increase the price by the values of 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, and 5.0. Processing node P− also includes five kinds of nodes to decrease the price by the same value as P+. The two kinds of judgment nodes are denoted by J1 and J2. The judgment node J1 compares the difference between the buying price and the selling price in each negotiation round. The judgment node J1 has 4 judgment results (less than 5% difference, less than 10% difference, less than 20% percent difference, equal or more than 20% difference). The judgment node J2 judges/checks the previous action of the participating agents. The judgment node J2 has 11 judgment results for all participating agents. In each round an action (P+, P− or Not Change) is determined by the GNP evolution.
Evolution of the System
The evolutionary process of the proposed system is a method called competitive coevolution; akin to the biological phenomena in nature, it can be described as a complementary evolution of closely associated species. Through this notion of nature, evolution is held among all individuals of one population and the selected (elite) individual of the opponent population. The use of coevolution is advantageous because it tends to increase fitness more effectively than normal evolution. We prepared 301 individuals for each GNP population. For example, if we consider the case where there are two GNP populations GNPi and GNPj, in the first generation, one individual from the GNPj population is selected randomly and set as agent j (seller). Then the individuals of the GNPi population are negotiated one by one with the selected individual of the GNPj population. In this way the best (elite) individual in GNPi population which obtained the highest fitness is found. Next, one individual is randomly selected from GNPi population and set as agent i (buyer); then the individuals of the GNPj population are negotiated one by one with the selected individual of GNPi population. In this way the best (elite) individual in GNPj population which obtained the highest fitness is found. In the second generation, the best individual in the first generation from GNPj population is selected and set as agent j. Then, the individuals of the GNPi population negotiate one by one with the best individual of GNPj population. Next, the individuals of the GNPj population negotiate in the same way. From the third generation, the same procedure is repeated to evolve all the populations. In each generation, the best (elite) individual of agent i and the best (elite) individual of agent j are obtained. The same coevolutionary procedure can be applied among more than two populations. Figure 2 shows the whole flowchart of the proposed system.
Parameters for Simulation
The simulation conditions are set as shown in Table 2 which are determined experimentally. In this simulation, first, 180 individuals are selected from the population by tournament selection and their genes are changed by mutation. Then, 120 individuals are also selected from the population and their genes are exchanged by crossover. Finally, 300 individuals are generated by crossover and mutation and one elite individual is included from the previous generation. Five kinds of processing nodes for P+, five other kinds of processing nodes for P−, and one Not Change node are used. Therefore, the total number of processing nodes is 11 (5+5+1). In addition, one initial node and two kinds of judgment nodes (J1 and J2) are also prepared. Therefore, in total, 14 kinds of nodes are prepared for each individual. The uses of processing nodes are to increase or decrease the price in the negotiation by certain values we defined in Section 4.4 (node function). That means in each negotiation round, the agents can stay or increase or decrease his/her price with the values assigned in the processing nodes. The two kinds of judgment nodes, J1 and J2, are used to compare the price difference, and to judge the previous action of agents in each negotiation round, respectively.
Simulation Result and Discussion
We assigned the initial offer of the buyers and the sellers as 50 yen and 100 yen, respectively. The strategy and symbiotic relations among agents are set arbitrarily, as shown in Fig. 3 , where each agent has a symbiotic relation towards other agents. In any negotiation, the most interesting part is to see how agents behave to reach an agreement. Considering the evolutionary computational perspectives, two key issues to be examined are the "number of successful negotiations in each generation" and the "fitness" of agents. 
Strategy and Symbiotic Relation
In this system the strategy and symbiotic relation are set in consideration of the real situation. In addition, we try to form interdependent relation among agents to make the situation more realistic and unique. In Strategy 1, the negotiation is held between one buyer (agent i) and two sellers (agent j1 and j2), where agent i takes Predation toward agent j1 and j2, while agent j1 and j2 take Mutualism toward agent i. This is a situation similar to an oligopoly market structure where a small number of sellers (in this case two) are in the market. These sellers are interdependent in the sense that the surplus (profit) earned by each seller depends on the seller's own action and on the action of the other seller. Like Strategy 1, this interdependency can be formed in all other strategies while there is more than one buyer or more than one seller participating in the negotiation. In Strategy 1, the strategy of agent i forces both agent j1 and j2 to form interdependency (indirect Competition) between themselves. This is because agent i wants to buy the product either from agent j1 or agent j2 whichever offers him/her the best price. Moreover, to reach an agreement both agent j1 and j2 can try to give more concessions. This is a kind of indirect competition or interdependency relationship between agent j1 and j2. In Strategy 2, the negotiation is held between one seller (agent j) and two buyers (agent i1 and i2) where agent j takes Predation toward agent i1 and i2, while agent i1 and i2 take Mutualism toward agent j. This is a situation similar to monopoly market structure. In this situation the strategy of agent j forces both agent i1 and agent i2 to form interdependency (indirect Competition) between themselves. In Strategy 3, the negotiation is held among one seller (agent j) and two buyers (agent i1 and i2) where both agent i1 and i2 take Mutualism toward agent j, while agent j also takes Mutualism toward agent i1 and i2. This is similar to monopolistic competition market structure. In this situation the strategy of agent j forces both agent i1 and i2 to form interdependency (indirect competition) between themselves. In Strategy 4, the negotiation is held between one buyer (agent i) and two sellers (agent j1 and j2) where agent i takes Competition toward both agent j1 and j2, and both agent j1 and j2 also take Competition toward agent i. In this situation the negotiation is not held because both the buyer and the sellers do not intend to compromise, i.e., they do not make any concession through the final round of negotiation.
Negotiation Process
While 100 rounds of negotiation are assigned, Strategy 1 (left side of Fig. 4 ) takes 58 rounds of proposals and counterproposals for agent i and agent j2 to reach agreement. In this case agent i does not change its price with respect to the counter proposal from agent j2, while agent j2 changes its price 39 times and stays at the current price 19 times. Although it seems that agent j1 competes with agent j2 and fails to reach agreement with agent i, this does not mean that agent j2 always achieves agreement. On the right side scenario of Fig. 4 , agent j1 reaches agreement with agent i, while agent j2 failes to do so. In this case, both agent i and agent j1 take 43 rounds of proposals and counter-proposals to reach agreement, where agent i does not change its price i.e., does not pay any concession. Agent j1, however, changes its price 31 times and stays at the current price 12 times. The reason why agent i does not pay a concession is that it tries to gain the full surplus by taking the Predation strategy toward both agent j1 and agent j2. These types of behaviors among agents are also found in Strategy 2 and Strategy 3 (Figs. 5 and 6) . In Strategy 4 a successful negotiation agreement is not formed because agents employed Competition against the other. In the proposed method it is realized that agents learn the strategy of opponent agents through the evolutionary process of the negotiation. In the negotiation, agents do not have the direct interaction between each other. They learn from each other through the offer and counter offer in the negotiation. Agents learn the basic algorithm of changing strategy for using P+ (increase price), P− (decrease price) or Not Change (stay at the current price) through the evolution, in term of the learning process and take her own strategy accordingly; whereas in conventional MAS an agent only knows her own strategy, but not the strategy of others. In this simulation it is strongly clarified that both agents comply with the basic algorithm of making concessions automatically through GNP evolution, and can take various strategies considering their symbiotic relations. Whereas in other negotiation protocols, such as monotonic concession protocol [26] , concessions are predetermined to reach an agreement. Therefore, we can claim that the problem we evolved using Masbiole can produce the automated, intelligent, and Pareto optimal solution. Figure 7 shows the number of successful negotiations in each generation for each strategy. For Strategy 4 there is no number of successful negotiations because the buyer and sellers cannot reach an agreement due to the Competition strategy used toward each other. In Strategy 1, when agent i achieves a successful negotiation with agent j1, agent j2 fails. Similarly, when agent j2 achieves a successful negotiation with agent i, agent j1 fails. So in Strategy 1, agent i represents the total number of successful negotiations in each generation where the combined successful negotiations of agent j1 and agent j2 are the same as agent i. Therefore, when the number of successful negotiations of agent j1 increases, agent j2's successful negotiations decrease. The reverse is also true. Same scenarios are found in Strategy 2 and Strategy 3. In Strategy 1 (Fig. 7) , in the first generation, the number of total successful negotiations is only 151 out of 301. As the generations propagate, agents became smarter due to an evolutionary process. This evolutionary utility is seen clearly in the last generation, i.e., in the 500th generation the number of successful negotiations increases to 278 out of 301. It is necessary to mention that the number of successful negotiations using Strategy 3 ( Fig. 7) is higher than in Strategy 1 or Strategy 2. This is because both sides, agent i on the one side and agents j1 and j2 on the other, employ the Mutualism strategy toward each other. In Strategy 3, the evolution almost converges i.e., in the final round the number of successful negotiations reaches 300.
Number of Successful Negotiation
Fitness of Agents
In each strategy the fitness of an agent is determined by its performance against other agents. Both buying and selling agents make an effort to understand the opponents' strategies and change the program in order to achieve higher fitness. Figures 8, 9 , and 10 show the fitness of participating agents in Strategy 1, Strategy 2 and Strategy 3, respectively. Strategy 4 does not produce any fitness because successful negotiation is not achieved due to the Competition used among agents.
The fitness graphs show the fitness of the best individual of each participating agent averaged over 50 independent simulations in each generation. In Strategy 1, agent i gets higher fitness due to its Predation towards both agent j1 and agent j2. The fitness of agent j1 and agent j2 became worse because of their Mutualism toward agent i as well as the interdependency (indirect Competition) between themselves. Using its Predation strategy, agent i does not pay any concession to conclude the negotiations (its concession is 0 yen), therefore, agent i receives all the surplus. The fitness of its opposing agents is 0, because to reach an agreement they have to pay the full concession. In Strategy 2, the fitness of both agent i1 and agent i2 is reduced because of their Mutualism toward agent j as well as the interdependency between themselves; whereas the fitness of agent j increases due to its Predation toward agent i1 and agent i2. In Strategy 3, the fitness of agent j increased because of her Mutualism toward both agent i1 and i2, whereas the fitness of agent i1 and agent i2 are not increased like agent j although they take Mutualism toward agent j. This is due to the interdependency (indirect Competition) between themselves. Strategy 4 does not produce any fitness for any agent because successful negotiation is not held in this situation. In each strategy, the fitness starts from a small value because in the early generations the number of successful negotiations is small.
In the simulation, Altruism is not applied in a sense that agents usually may not like to take a loss by using Altruism toward another agent. But depending on the objectives and the problem nature, Altruism can be applicable. For instance, in a negotiation of selling electric power to an industrial company, government may take the Altruism strategy and take a loss for itself (sell for less than production cost), thereby aiming for rapid industrialization that will generate income for citizens and reduce the unemployment rate, which will ultimately produce a benefit for the government. Similarly, a seller can choose to utilize Altruism in a situation where there are lots of products in stock, or when the expiration date of the products is very near. In this case Altruism, or taking a loss, will enable the seller to clear his stock as soon possible. In this study, the situations where Altruism would be beneficial are not considered.
Pareto Analysis
The conventional studies of Pareto analysis usually include only two agents (players). However, in this study, the Pareto analysis is done among more then 2 agents (players). Therefore, some emerging and interesting results are found. In each strategy, the figures of the Pareto front or Pareto set represent all the Pareto optimal solutions from the last generation, i.e., in the 500th generation where agents are evolved enough. From the Pareto front we can find what is ultimately possible for agents that try their best to maximize fitness (surplus) in each solution. In the figures of Pareto front, E(i) represents the outcome (utility) of agent i while E(j) represents the outcome (utility) of agent j. In the same way, E(i1) and E(i2) represent the outcome (utility) of agent i1 and agent i2, respectively, while E(j1) and E(j2) represent the outcome (utility) of agent j1 and agent j2, respectively.
In Strategy 1, the Pareto front (plotted at E(i) = 1.0 and E(j1) = 0.0) at the left side of Fig. 11 contains all the Pareto optimal solutions between agent i and agent j1, while the Pareto front (plotted at E(i) = 1.0 and E(j2) = 0.0) at the right side of Fig. 11 contains all the Pareto optimal solutions between agent i and agent j2. This is because agent i takes full surplus (fitness) in each negotiation solution as a result of taking Predation toward both agent j1 and j2. In Strategy 2, the Pareto front (plotted at E(j) = 1.0 and E(i1) = 0.0) at the left side of Fig. 12 contains all the Pareto optimal solutions between agent j and agent i1, while the Pareto front (plotted at E(j) = 1.0 and E(i2) = 0.0) at the right side of Fig. 12 contains all the Pareto optimal solutions between agent j and agent i2. This is because agent j takes full surplus (fitness) in each negotiation solution as a result of taking Predation toward both agent i1 and i2. In Strategy 3, the Pareto front at the left side of Fig. 13 contains the Pareto optimal solutions between agent j and agent i1 while the Pareto front at the right side of Fig. 13 contains the Pareto optimal solutions between agent j and agent i2. In this strategy it shows that various Pareto optimal solutions are plotted on the Pareto front on both sides of the figure. This is because of the Mutualism strategy agents take toward each other. In Strategy 4, there is no Pareto front because the negotiation solution is not formed among agents due to their Competition strategy.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this study, the aim was a concrete assessment of the characteristics and effectiveness of Masbiole. Therefore, instead of depending on MAS test beds; in the simulations a competitive negotiation model that can be applicable in a real world advanced intelligent negotiation among business organizations is designed. A negotiation protocol for agent behavior during evolution is devised. In the simulations, an evolutionary com-putation model called Genetic Network Programming (GNP) is used for realizing agents. The simulation results show that Masbiole can be used not only in competitive and cooperative strategies, but also in other strategies depending on the complexity and objective of the problem. It is explained how agents' strategies in Masbiole correspond to the real market structures. In the simulation results it is found that the solution using Masbiole produces Pareto optimality automatically where the benefits and losses can be determined in advance for multiple agents using the symbiotic relations. In addition to the negotiation, the proposed model can be apply in other business policies where different strategies are necessary to consider the market situation, stock and demand of products, number of competitor in the market as well as organization's own business policy towards other business organization. Outside the business area, the proposed method can solve optimization problems more effectively that include social science and engineering. In addition, the characteristics, behaviors, and intelligent decisionmaking mechanism of agents realized in this research can help to design more efficient architecture in the area of next generation evolutionary computing. The author intends to design more complex and sophisticated problems in the future which require total optimization, especially in engineering design and modeling where solutions are difficult to achieve using conventional MAS.
